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ABSTRACT
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) estimates that
between 1940
1
and 1978 eleven million people were exposed to asbestos. Unfortunately,
asbestos usage was prevalent long before its harmful effects were
discovered. Taking anywhere from twenty to fifty years to develop, up to2
10% of people with prolonged exposure to asbestos contract mesothelioma.
Thought to be harmless, asbestos was often used as insulation in many
buildings because of its fire resistant qualities. As a result, companies
exposed their employees to asbestos on a daily basis for decades. Asbestos’
fibrous quality allows the mineral to embed itself in fabrics, including the
fabrics of employees’ clothing. Workers exposed to asbestos, who went
home with asbestos fibers embedded in their clothing, often accidently
exposed their family members and others to asbestos. This take-home
exposure to asbestos resulted in sickness and death for many people
unaffiliated with the asbestos worker’s company.
Family members exposed to secondhand asbestos often file negligence
actions against their loved ones’ employers. In these cases, the family
member plaintiffs, often dealing with a fatal illness and a mountain of
hospital bills through no fault of their own, typically allege that the
employer negligently managed the toxin. Conversely, defendants, facing a
hefty lawsuit from a remote plaintiff, frequently argue that they owed no
duty to the plaintiffs because these plaintiffs never worked for them.
As the saying goes, hard cases make bad law. The tension between
plaintiffs with large losses and defendants with only remote responsibility
creates complicated cases, and as a result, inconsistent law. In determining
whether an employer owes a duty to a non-employee whose exposure to
asbestos occurred off premises, state courts have applied different tests,
thereby achieving wildly different results in cases involving substantially
similar fact patterns.
This Note proposes a multi-factored test that emphasizes the importance
of foreseeability in duty determinations. In the first section it discusses the
1. ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/statistics.php (last visited
Jul. 27, 2017).
2. Id.
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case precedent that illustrates the various approaches utilized by courts
around the nation. The second section describes the solutions explored by
secondary sources. In the last section, this Note advocates for a modified
version of the Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. test. Like the test in
Satterfield, this modified test will emphasize the importance of
foreseeability as a necessary first step in duty analysis. However, unlike the
Satterfield test, this modified test will not consider whether the conduct
constitutes misfeasance or nonfeasance as a factor in determining whether
companies owe third-party plaintiffs a duty of care in take-home exposure
cases. Finally, although courts are (in many jurisdictions) without statutory
authority on the matter, this Note takes the position that legislative action
can solve this problem much more efficiently than judicial action. The
legislature should direct the courts to consider certain factors rather than
allowing them to create their own judicial balancing test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous negligence claims involving take-home asbestos exposure
were filed in the last twenty years.3 With some variation, most of these cases
follow a general fact pattern: Company B employs A. In the course of
employment, A is exposed to asbestos fibers. These fibers attach to A’s
clothing, and he exposes family member C to the asbestos fibers somewhere
outside the workplace. C develops mesothelioma and brings a suit to
recover damages from Company B. Because mesothelioma is an “asbestosrelated cancer,”4 causation and damages are usually not the primary
concern, leaving the duty determination as the sole disputed issue.
Accordingly, Company B frequently argues that it owes no duty to family
member C, a third-party plaintiff, who was exposed to the asbestos off-site.
Despite similar fact patterns in most cases,5 courts have applied many

3. Sheila Doyle Kelley & Allison N. Fihma, United States: Recent Trends in Asbestos
Litigation, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/203748/Personal+Injury/
Recent+Trends+in+Asbestos+Litigation (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
4. ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
5. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011); Miller
v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.)., 740
N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 2007); Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio
2010); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
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different tests to determine duty, consequently reaching wildly different
results.6
A. Satterfield Gave Great Weight to Foreseeability Over Other Factors.
In Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., twenty-four-year-old Amanda
Satterfield died from mesothelioma.7 Her estate tried to recover damages
from her father’s employer, Alcoa.8 In many of its operations, Alcoa used
asbestos.9 In the 1930s, Alcoa became aware that asbestos is a highly
dangerous substance and discovered that “the air in its factories contained
high levels of asbestos fibers and that its employees were being exposed to
these fibers on a daily basis.”10 Later, in the 1960s, Alcoa learned that the
family members of its employees were at increased medical risk due to their
regular exposure to asbestos on employee clothing.11 In 1972, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) released
regulations that prohibited employees who had been exposed to asbestos
from taking their work clothes home to be laundered.12 These regulations
notified all American businesses of the harmful effects of asbestos exposure.
Ms. Satterfield’s father, Doug Satterfield, worked at Alcoa after the
OSHA regulations on asbestos were released.13 His assignments resulted in
daily exposure to high levels of asbestos dust and fibers, but Alcoa did not
educate Mr. Satterfield about the risks associated with handling asbestos.14
During Mr. Satterfield’s time with Alcoa, Ms. Amanda Satterfield was born
prematurely and spent the first three months of her life in the hospital.15
Every day, Mr. Satterfield visited his daughter in “the hospital immediately
after work [while] wearing his asbestos-contaminated work clothes.”16
Accordingly, “from the day of her birth, Ms. Satterfield was exposed to the
asbestos fibers on her father’s work clothes.”17 When Ms. Satterfield was
6. See generally Price, 26 A.3d at 162; Miller, 740 N.W.2d at 209; Boley, 929 N.E.2d at
448; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 347.
7. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 352.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 352-53.
12. Id. at 353.
13. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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diagnosed with mesothelioma, she filed suit against Breeding Insulation
Company (“Breeding”) and Alcoa.18 Following her unfortunate death at the
young age of twenty-four, her father was substituted as plaintiff and
voluntarily dismissed the claims against Breeding.19 Alcoa, however, argued
that it owed no duty to its employee’s daughter.20 After the trial court
dismissed the claim, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling.21
In Satterfield, the issue was whether Alcoa owed a duty of reasonable care
to Ms. Satterfield.22 To resolve this matter, the court first looked to the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.23 The court, having
determined that there was misfeasance in this case, heavily emphasized the
importance of foreseeability in determining whether a defendant owed a
duty to a plaintiff.24 Only if the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable could
the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff.25 Then, after determining
foreseeability, the Satterfield court sought to determine if there were any
countervailing principles that prevented the defendant from owing a duty
to the plaintiff.26
The Satterfield court described two potential categories of negligence
cases. In the first category, defendants “[have] engaged in an affirmative act
that created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to [the
plaintiff].”27 For cases in this category, the court considers whether
“countervailing legal principles or policy considerations warrant
determining that [the defendant] nevertheless owed no duty [to the
plaintiff].”28 In the second possible category of cases, defendants are
negligent by omission.29 In these cases, the court looks to see whether there
is “the sort of special relationship . . . that gives rise to a duty.”30 Because

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 354.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
See id. at 364-65.
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 366.
Id. at 355.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 355.
Id.
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duty is an essential element of all negligence claims,31 the Satterfield court
reasoned that Ms. Satterfield’s claim would fail if Alcoa did not owe her a
duty.32
Generally, “persons have a duty . . . to refrain from engaging in
affirmative acts that a reasonable person ‘should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another’ or acts
‘which involve[ ] an unreasonable risk of harm to another.’”33 However, this
general rule does not necessarily “require that persons always act reasonably
to secure the safety of others.”34 Instead, the general rule against engaging in
unreasonably risky affirmative acts “serve[s] a more limited role as
restraints upon a person’s actions that create unreasonable and foreseeable
risks of harm to others.”35
Next, the Satterfield court elaborated on the distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance is “active misconduct working
positive injury to others,” while nonfeasance constitutes “passive inaction,”
such as “a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or [failing] to
protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant.”36 However, it is possible for omissions to be categorized as
misfeasance.37
After explaining the general duty to refrain from unreasonably risky acts,
the Satterfield court noted that the “no duty to act” rule is not without
exception. In cases where certain special relationships exist between the
defendant and either the source of the danger or the person who is
foreseeably at risk from the danger, “[t]hese relationships create an
affirmative duty either to control the person who is the source of the danger
or to protect the person who is endangered.”38
After explaining its own view of the law, the court then compared the
precedent established by other state courts. Some courts have held that
there can be no liability in the absence of a special relationship between the

31. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 284, 302, (1965) (alterations in
original)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of
Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.REV. 217, 219 (1908)).
37. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357.
38. Id. at 359-60 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, B; 315 (1965)).
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plaintiff and the employer,39 while others have held that employers commit
misfeasance by operating their factories in such a way as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm of asbestos exposure to those who came into
contact with its employees.40 The Satterfield court held that requiring a
special relationship for there to be a duty would be misplaced under
Tennessee tort law.41 The court explained that “[w]hether a case involves a
simple automobile accident or a complicated toxic tort, Tennessee law
currently provides that one owes a duty to refrain from engaging in conduct
that creates an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to others.”42
The Satterfield court further held that the case “involve[d] a risk created
through misfeasance.”43 The court emphasized that “Alcoa was aware of the
dangerous amounts of asbestos on its employees’ clothes,” yet “did not
inform its employees that the materials that they were handling contained
asbestos or of the risks posed by asbestos fibers to the employees or to
others.”44 In addition, “Alcoa dissuaded its employees from using on-site
bathhouse facilities, and it failed to provide coveralls or to wash its
employees’ work clothes at the factory.”45 These facts constituted
misfeasance.
The duty inquiry did not end after determining whether there was
misfeasance or nonfeasance.46 The Satterfield court next considered whether
a duty existed, and if so, to what extent.47 In determining the existence and
scope of duty, the court considered public policy because “the concept of
duty is largely an expression of policy considerations.”48 Though public
policy is important, the Satterfield court emphatically rejected any notion
that “the concept of duty is a freefloating application of public policy.”49 The
court reasoned that because “[i]n most cases today . . . the presence or
absence of a duty is a given rather than a matter of reasoned debate,

39. See id. at 361 (citing Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from
Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 222 (Mich. 2007)).
40. See id. at 362(citing Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579–7–I, 2007 WL
2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 363.
43. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 364.
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 364.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 364-65 (quoting Burroughs v. McGee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tenn. 2003)).
49. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365.
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discussion, or contention,”50 courts should “turn to public policy for
guidance” when “the existence of a particular duty is not a given or when
the rules . . . are not readily applicable.”51
After noting the role public policy plays in determining the existence and
scope of one’s duty, the court listed eight factors that are useful for this
public policy determination:
(1) the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring;
(2) the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; (3)
the importance or social value of the activity engaged in by the
defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the defendant; (5)
the feasibility of alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative
costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the
relative usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the relative safety
of alternative conduct.52
Regarding foreseeability, the court analyzed Alcoa’s knowledge of
asbestos. Given that Alcoa knew of asbestos’ many dangers and chose not to
inform its employees of these dangers, “it was foreseeable that Ms.
Satterfield would come into close contact with Mr. Satterfield’s work clothes
on an extended and repeated basis.”53 After determining that the risk of Ms.
Satterfield being exposed to asbestos fibers was foreseeable, the court shifted
its analysis to a balancing of the other factors.54
The potential harm to Ms. Satterfield was great because of the risk of fatal
illnesses caused by exposure to asbestos.55 As for importance or social value
of the activity engaged in by the defendant and usefulness of the conduct to
the defendant, the court noted the social value of job creation and
manufacturing useful products.56 However, no connection between the
allegedly negligent acts and Alcoa’s ability to provide employment or
manufacture useful products was found.57 There was no demonstration that
“the sort of exposure to asbestos that is involved in this case is a largely
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 367. The court also considered that “Alcoa allegedly (1) failed to inform its
employees that they were working with materials containing asbestos; (2) failed to provide its
employees with or to require them to wear protective covering on their clothes; (3) actively
discouraged its employees’ use of on-site bathhouse facilities for changing or cleaning.” Id.
54. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367.
55. Id. at 368.
56. See id.
57. Id.
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unavoidable part of its manufacturing operations.”58 Considering whether
alternative conduct was feasible, the court found that Alcoa could have
greatly reduced the risk of asbestos exposure without undue burden.59 The
court stated that “Alcoa had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent
exposure to asbestos fibers not only to its employees, but also to those who
came into close regular contact with its employees’ contaminated work
clothes over an extended period of time.60
Finally, the Satterfield court addressed the argument that Ms. Satterfield
fell outside the “proper scope of the class of persons to whom a duty is owed
in cases of this sort.”61 Alcoa argued that recognizing Ms. Satterfield’s claim
would greatly expand the scope of employers’ duty, explaining as follows:
[N]o principled basis exists to limit the duty to the members of
the employee’s immediate family living in the employee’s house
and thus that recognizing a duty to these family members will
eventually result in the recognition of a duty with regard to
babysitters, housekeepers, home repair contractors, and nextdoor neighbors.62
While acknowledging the validity of Alcoa’s concerns,63 the court held
that “[p]ublic policy does not warrant finding that there is no duty owed to
such persons.”64 Satterfield recognized the existence of a duty, relying upon
the notion that the defendant had created a risk.65 The court limited the
class of persons to whom a duty is owed to “persons who came into close
and regular contact over an extended period of time with its employees’
work clothes.”66 Satterfield found this “fair and proportional duty” to be

58. Id.
59. Id. The risk of asbestos exposure
[C]ould have been greatly reduced had Alcoa (1) provided basic warnings to its
employees about the dangers of asbestos, (2) required safer handling of the
materials containing asbestos, (3) provided coveralls to its employees, (4)
required employees to change their clothes before leaving the workplace, (5)
laundered its employees’ work clothes on site, or (6) encouraged its employees
to use the on-site bathhouse facilities before leaving work.
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 368.
60. Id. at 369.
61. Id. at 373.
62. Id. at 374.
63. Id.
64. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 374.
65. Id. at 375.
66. See id.
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“neither limitless nor impractical.”67 Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the trial court erred by awarding Alcoa judgment on the
pleadings; it affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court and
remanded the case back to the trial court.
B. Approaches Taken by Other State Courts
Like the Tennessee Supreme Court, other state supreme courts heavily
emphasized foreseeability, while others rejected the use of foreseeability in
determining the existence of a duty altogether. However, each of the other
courts differ from Satterfield to some degree regarding the importance it
attaches to foreseeability in determining the existence and scope of one’s
duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to third parties.
1. Foreseeability Focus
Many courts emphasize the importance of foreseeability in analyzing
duty for take-home asbestos exposure cases.68 In Rochon v. Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos during his
employment, and he brought those asbestos fibers into their home on his
clothing.69 The plaintiff alleged that she inhaled those fibers while
laundering her husband’s clothing and as a result eventually developed
mesothelioma.70
Similar to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Washington Court of
Appeals in Rochon noted that “[w]hether an affirmative duty to act exists
depends upon many factors, including ‘mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.’”71 The Rochon court, like
Satterfield, considered foreseeability to be “part of the duty inquiry.”72 In
Rochon, the court explained that “[t]he most common and obvious [way for
a legal duty to arise] is when a party takes an affirmative action that results
in an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”73 The court noted that an act is

67. Id. at 375.
68. See generally Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012)
(referring to foreseeability as a “necessary factor to finding a duty”); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d
at 366 (noting foreseeability’s “paramount importance”); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings,
Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (remanding for
discovery on foreseeability).
69. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (determining “[w]hether harm is foreseeable is part of the duty inquiry”).
73. Id. at *2.
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only “‘unreasonable’ . . . if a reasonable person would have foreseen the
risk.”74 If this reasoning is to be followed, foreseeability is necessarily
relevant to the determination of whether a duty exists.
The Rochon court further analyzed whether, under the facts of the case,
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.75 Its conclusion resembled the
Satterfield court’s in that it was the defendant’s “own affirmative acts—
operating its own factory in an unsafe manner—that allegedly caused [the
plaintiff’s] illness, not either a failure to act or the act of a third party.”76 The
court rejected an argument from the defendant that “extending a duty to
[the plaintiff] will expose employers to endless litigation.”77 Much like
Satterfield, the Rochon court disagreed with this argument,78 citing limiting
factors such as the requirement for causation;79 that the duty arises only
regarding damage caused by the defendant’s own affirmative acts;80 and the
role courts and juries can play in limiting duty81 as reasons for
disagreement. However, unlike the Satterfield court,82 Rochon did not
consider other factors that limit the scope of one’s duty.
2. Legal Relationship Focus
In Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the Delaware Supreme Court
focused its duty analysis on whether the conduct complained of was
misfeasance or nonfeasance.83 In Price, the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos
fibers while living with her husband from 1957 to 1991.84 Her husband, who
worked for DuPont, was exposed to the fibers at work, which caused the
plaintiff to be repeatedly exposed to the fibers at home.85 The plaintiff
alleged that “DuPont knew or should have known that the asbestos fibers
74. Id.
75. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *2-3.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *4.
78. See id.
79. See id. at *5 (stating that a “general duty to act reasonably . . . will only extend to a
victim if the victim proves that his or her injury was a foreseeable consequence of its actions”)
(emphasis added).
80. See id. at 4. (“[T]he duty is only one to act reasonably to prevent injury from
[defendant’s] own risky acts, not to protect [plaintiff] from acts of third parties or from
circumstances it did not create.”).
81. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4.
82. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 365 (Tenn. 2008).
83. Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 167-68 (Del. 2011).
84. Id. at 164.
85. Id.
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would be transported.”86 The court determined that the conduct constituted
nonfeasance.87 Because the conduct constituted nonfeasance, the court
required the plaintiff to allege that a “‘special relationship’ existed between
her and [the defendant] in order for [the defendant] to owe her a duty of
care.”88 The court held that the plaintiff had not established any special
relationship, and that accordingly, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a
duty.89
3. Factor Balancing Approach
In CSX Transp. Inc. v. Williams, four plaintiffs brought suit under
Georgia negligence law, claiming that “clothing exposure” contributed to
their asbestos-related disease.90 The Georgia Supreme Court framed the
issue as whether an employer owed a duty to third-party, non-employees
who encounter asbestos-tainted work clothing at locations away from the
workplace.91 The court first considered whether CSXT owed a duty as an
employer to a third-party. Although “[u]nder Georgia statutory and
common law, an employer owes a duty to his employee to furnish a
reasonably safe place to work and to exercise ordinary care and diligence to
keep it safe,”92 the plaintiffs were not employees of CSXT. Therefore, CSXT
owed no specific duty to the plaintiffs.93 Next, the court discussed “duties
beyond the scope of an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace.”94 In
doing so, the court considered a combination of three factors: (1) whether
there was an employer-employee relationship;95 (2) whether there was
misfeasance;96 and (3) whether the exposure occurred at the workplace.97
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 168.
88. Id. at 169.
89. Price, 26 A.3d at 169-70.
90. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 210.
95. See id. (“The court in that case held the common law duty to provide employees
with a safe workplace ‘has not been extended to encompass individuals . . . who are neither
“employees” nor “employed” at the worksite.’”).
96. See Williams, 608 S.E.2d at 210 (“[W]here one by his own act . . . creates a dangerous
situation, he is under a duty to remove the hazard or give warning of the danger . . . .
However, these cases do not involve CSXT itself spreading asbestos dust among the general
population, thereby creating a dangerous situation . . . .”).
97. See id.
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Relying on these factors, the Georgia Supreme Court held that “Georgia
negligence law does not impose any duty on an employer to a third-party,
non-employee, who comes into contact with its employee’s asbestos-tainted
work clothing at locations away from the workplace.”98
4. Limiting Widespread Liability
In the case of In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., the Court of Appeals of New
York considered whether the defendant, the New York City Port Authority
(“NYCPA”), owed a duty to plaintiff-wife, who was injured by at-home
exposure to asbestos dust that plaintiff-husband brought home on his work
clothes.99 The court listed several factors that courts traditionally balance to
make duty determinations,100 but ultimately sought to limit the potential
expansion of liability.101 In its analysis, the court rejected the notion that
foreseeability defines duty.102 The court, instead, considered foreseeability to
be a factor that determines the scope of one’s duty, but only after it has been
determined that a duty exists.103
The court then considered the plaintiff’s arguments that the NYCPA
owed a duty by virtue of its status as an employer.104 Considering precedent
from multiple jurisdictions, including CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams,105 the
court held that an employer only owes a duty to provide a “safe workplace”
to its employees.106 The court then addressed the plaintiff’s alternative claim
that the NYCPA owed a duty of care due to its status as a landowner. The
court noted that “[a] landowner generally must ‘exercise reasonable care,
with regard to any activities which he carries on, for the protection of those

98. Id. at 210.
99. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. 2005).
100. Id. at 119 (“Courts traditionally fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the
reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the
likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation
allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of
liability.”).
101. See id. (“Thus, in determining whether a duty exists, courts must be mindful of the
precedential, and consequential, future effects of their rulings, and limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree;” and discussing “the specter of limitless
liability” as well as “judicial resistance to expansion of duty.”).
102. Id. (“Foreseeability, alone, does not define duty . . . .”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 120-22.
105. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 121.
106. Id. at 120-21.
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outside of his premises.’”107 However, the court suggested that the plaintiffs
were, “in effect, asking us to upset our long-settled common-law notions of
an employer’s and landowner’s duties.”108 The court balked at the idea of
the defendant owing the plaintiff-wife a duty, instead it suggested that a
finding of duty in this case would create limitless liability.109
5. Judicial Reliance on State Legislature
In Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the wife of an employee working
with asbestos-containing materials sued Goodyear when she was diagnosed
with malignant mesothelioma years after her husband had stopped working
for the company.110 The defendant moved for summary judgment, relying
on an Ohio statute.111 The statute provided that premises owners are “not
liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure
unless that individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was
at the premises owner’s property.”112 The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendant,113 the appellate court affirmed,114 and
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.115 Rather than engaging in complicated
balancing tests and “implicat[ing] [the] core principles of [state] tort law,”116
the Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated by applying Ohio’s statutory scheme.
In effect, the state legislature took the balancing of social policy out of the
judicial branch’s hands. Accordingly, the court was able to rely on canons of
statutory construction to adjudicate rather than judicial balancing.117

107. Id. at 121 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 387 (5th ed.
1984)).
108. Id. at 122.
109. See id. (“This line is not so easy to draw, however. . . . [T]he ‘specter of limitless
liability’ is banished only when ‘the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is
circumscribed by the relationship’”); see also id. (“[W]e must consider the likely
consequences of adopting the expanded duty urged by plaintiffs.”).
110. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 449-50 (Ohio 2010).
111. Id. at 450.
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(1) (West).
113. Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 450.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 453.
116. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tenn. 2008).
117. See generally Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 452. (choosing a construction that “[gave] such
interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it . . . the legislative intent behind
R.C. 2307.941(A) is apparent”).
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C. Secondary Source Approaches
Secondary sources have differing views on the take-home exposure cases.
While some have taken the view that take-home exposure cases have no
merit,118 others have created balancing tests.119
1. The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-Home” Cases
One solution proposed by secondary sources is that courts should take
an approach similar to In re N.Y.C. Asbestos,120 which seeks to limit liability
in take-home cases. In The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “TakeHome” Cases, the author’s argument emphasizes causation and the
probability that take-home asbestos exposure results in mesothelioma.121
Finding the probability of developing mesothelioma to be low,122 the author
attacked the credibility of testifying plaintiffs’ experts that suggest low levels
of take-home exposure can cause mesothelioma.123 Instead, the author
suggested that spontaneous disease is the real cause for most mesothelioma
diagnoses.124
Under the author’s view, plaintiffs proceed beyond summary judgment
too easily because experts routinely testify that “any exposure” can lead to
the development of mesothelioma.125 To solve this problem, the author
proposed multiple solutions. First, considering the experts’ any exposure
theories, the author suggested that courts should limit the duty owed by
employers by including “an outright restriction on duty beyond the
immediate workplace.”126 Second, the author suggested that courts should
118. William L. Anderson, The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-Home”
Cases, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 107, 129 (2015).
119. Meghan E. Flinn, A Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State
Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 746
(2014).
120. See supra Section I.B.4.
121. Anderson, supra note 118, at 114-15 (considering what the graph would have looked
like had “even the most minimal level of ‘take-home’ asbestos fibers cause[d] spousal
mesothelioma”).
122. Id. at 115 (“Thus, the actual incidence of mesothelioma illustrates exactly how hard
it is to develop mesothelioma from take-home exposures. The dose received really does
matter.”).
123. Id. (“Given this data, it is virtually certain that low levels of take-home, clotheswashing exposures do not cause mesothelioma, and plaintiff experts are incorrect when they
so testify.”).
124. Id. at 116.
125. See id. at 122-24.
126. Id. at 127.
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consistently reject the any exposure theory and require plaintiffs to “prove a
causative dose consistent with epidemiology studies showing disease in
exposed populations.”127
2. Multi-Factored Judicial Test Solution
Another proposed solution includes a multi-factored test. Continuing
War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for TakeHome Asbestos Exposure noted that while “courts commonly hold four
specific factors as important in duty analysis: the foreseeability of harm, the
relationship between the parties, the burden that creating a duty will place
on the defendant, and public policy considerations . . . [n]one of these
factors alone suffices to establish a duty.”128 Accordingly, the author creates
a test that combines the four factors, creating a flexible test that allows state
courts to apply their own state law while respecting the policy
considerations of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.129 Finally, the article
proposes that despite the flexibility of the judicial test, a legislative action
could solve the take-home exposure problem much more effectively than
the courts.130
II. FOCUSING ON FORESEEABILITY IN A MULTI-FACTORED BALANCING TEST
BEST ADJUDICATES DUTY’S ROLE IN COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS.
The ideal test for adjudicating duty is a multifactor test that focuses on
foreseeability as a threshold determination. Under this paradigm,
foreseeability would be treated as an essential element necessary to prove
the existence of a duty owed by the employer to the third-party plaintiff.
Only after foreseeability is established should the court continue its analysis
with other factors such as the existence of a legal relationship, the burden of
preventing the harm, the possible magnitude of the potential harm or
injury, the feasibility of alternative conduct, and the relative safety of that
alternative conduct.
Upon a finding of foreseeable injury, these other factors serve as a way
for courts to determine the scope of this duty. They are only relevant if the
court finds that the injury was foreseeable. Absent a finding of foreseeable

127. Anderson, supra note 118, at 127-28.
128. Flinn, supra note 119, at 746.
129. See id. at 751 (“Allowing for flexibility within the structure of a four-prong test
ensures that a state can conform to its negligence jurisprudence while bringing an element of
uniformity to duty analysis nationwide.”).
130. See id. at 751-56.
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harm, other factors need not be considered because there is no duty without
foreseeability.
Under this test, “to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show
that the risk was foreseeable, but that showing is not, in and of itself,
sufficient to create a duty. Instead, if [the court finds the risk foreseeable, it
will] then undertake the balancing analysis.”131 Much like Satterfield’s test,
this multi-step analysis may involve a balancing of several factors, but,
unlike Satterfield, this test will not distinguish between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. Although there is a distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance,132 this distinction has been given too much power in other
tests. Furthermore, this test expressly rejects “no duty” findings for the
purpose of avoiding “the specter of limitless liability.” This is not to say that
public policy may not limit one’s duty, but rather that a court seeking to
limit duty on public policy grounds must refer to some specific public
interest or policy that would be furthered by finding no duty.
A. Foreseeability First: Why Foreseeability Is Essential and Why
Foreseeability Must be Considered First
There are many policies that can be considered when determining
whether a duty exists,133 but above all, foreseeability should be treated as a
necessary element of duty. However, foreseeability alone is insufficient to
create a duty.134 Rather, foreseeability should be considered first as a
threshold issue.
1. Foreseeability is a practical first step in analysis because it limits
frivolous claims.
Examining foreseeability first can help courts limit the number of
frivolous claims in asbestos litigation. “The United States Supreme Court
has noted [that there is an] ‘elephantine mass of asbestos cases.’”135 Most
131. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn. 2008).
132. In cases of misfeasance, “the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the
plaintiff,” but in cases of nonfeasance, “he has at least made his situation no worse, and has
merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs.” Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 356.
133. See generally Chaisson v. Avondale Indus. 947 So. 2d 171, 182 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
134. Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 206 Cal. App. 4th 15, 31 (2012), as modified on denial
of reh’g (June 19, 2012) (quoting Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 552 (1999))
(“[F]oreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty.”); Miller v. Ford
Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d
206, 212 (Mich. 2007) (“[T]hat the harm was foreseeable is also not dispositive.”).
135. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 369 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)).
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asbestos claims result “from attorney-sponsored mass screenings and
involve plaintiffs with little or no asbestos-related impairment.”136 With so
many claims, some of them frivolous, it is important that courts find a way
to efficiently adjudicate these cases without unjustly excluding meritorious
claims. By treating foreseeability as the threshold element of duty analysis,
courts can “quickly eliminate factually deficient cases at summary
judgment.”137 If faced with a case where the harm was not foreseeable, “a
court could rule in favor of the defendant on the issue of duty without
resorting to a jury.”138 This approach allows courts to categorically remove
cases in which the harm was not foreseeable, without dismissing valid
claims unnecessarily. A claim dismissed for lack of foreseeability is
dismissed for good cause.139 Likewise, a case featuring foreseeable injury
deserves further analysis on the duty issue.
Although not universally accepted,140 the idea of addressing foreseeability
first is shared among many jurisdictions, even those that give substantial
weight to other factors. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan,
despite its reliance on the relationship of the parties, noted that “[w]hen the
harm is not foreseeable, no duty can be imposed on the defendant. But
when the harm is foreseeable, a duty still does not necessarily exist.”141
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Illinois understands foreseeability to be
essential to duty determinations. “Though foreseeability is not the only
factor we consider, it is a necessary factor to finding a duty. If the injury was
not reasonably foreseeable, no duty can exist.”142 By giving foreseeability
such heavy emphasis and by utilizing foreseeability as a necessary starting
point, this test reflects the common value shared by multiple state courts
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts.143

136. Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: The Tide Appears
to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 477 (2006).
137. Flinn, supra note 119, at 747.
138. Id. at 748.
139. See Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012) (“Though
foreseeability is not the only factor we consider, it is a necessary factor to finding a duty. If
the injury was not reasonably foreseeable, no duty can exist.”).
140. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005)
(explaining that foreseeability is only used after duty is determined).
141. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex.), 740 N.W. 2d 206, 212 (Mich. 2007).
142. Simpkins, 965 N.E.2d at 1098.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) (“Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in
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2. Examining foreseeability first does not create unlimited liability.
Some defendants argue that companies will be exposed to enormous
financial burden if exposed to liability for illnesses caused by exposure to
asbestos fibers in the manufacturing process.144 This argument is
unpersuasive for three reasons.145 First, from a logical perspective, a
principle of law that emphasizes foreseeability does not create a new and
endless stream of plaintiffs via stare decisis; it merely focuses on
particularized circumstances in a particular case. Though two separate cases
may both involve foreseeable harm, these two cases may have factual
differences. These factual differences may include the availability of
alternative conduct to a given defendant, or perhaps the social utility the
defendant’s conduct. Second, the structure of the negligence cause of action,
as well as the test for which this Note advocates, requires plaintiffs to prove
much more than mere foreseeability. Simply emphasizing foreseeability
does not cause widespread liability.146 Third, because of the structural
safeguards inherent in the negligence cause of action, any potential
expansion of liability arising out of an emphasis on foreseeability is not
unjust.147
A court does not broaden liability by emphasizing foreseeability, nor
does a court broaden liability by considering foreseeability first. Consider
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.; there, the court suggested that “public policy
concerns about the fairness and proportionality of [a duty arising out of
foreseeable risk] should dissipate”148 because “[t]he duty . . . recognize[d] in
these circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm
to plaintiff’s wife.”149
The Olivo court is not alone in making this assertion.150 In fact, the idea
that finding a duty to third parties in take-home exposure cases would
create limitless liability “seriously overstates what the consequences of
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”).
144. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 371 (Tenn. 2008)
(Defendant suggests that “manufacturers who use materials containing asbestos in their
manufacturing process will face enormous financial burdens if they are exposed to liability
for illnesses caused by exposure to asbestos fibers in their manufacturing processes.”).
145. Id. (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”).
146. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375; Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579–
7–I, 2007 WL 2325214 at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
147. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4.
148. Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1150 (N.J. 2006).
149. Id.
150. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375; Rochon, WL 2325214, at *4.
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imposing a burden on defendant would truly be.”151 “[The question of duty
in each case] asks whether this defendant should be found to have a duty
owed to [plaintiff]. Thus, the potential burden must be examined in this
limited context, not extrapolated to all other imaginable potential
litigants.”152 As the Chaisson court stated, “limitless liability would not be
created in this case if we found a duty under these particular facts and
circumstances.”153
Because each case is decided upon particular facts and circumstances
presented by the parties, it logically follows that any expansion of liability
would only expand liability to those cases that have similar facts and
circumstances.154 Courts arriving at similar results after applying a set of
factors to similar facts are not expanding liability, they are merely
upholding stare decisis.155 Thus, an argument that suggests the defendant
owed no duty in order to prevent limitless liability rests on one of two
premises: either the argument incorrectly suggests that stare decisis would
result in liability in dissimilar cases; or that it would be financially unfair to
hold a particular defendant liable. The first of these premises is inconsistent

151. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 225 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., 947 So. 2d 171, 182 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
154. There are factual scenarios that could easily be outcome determinative on many
different factors. For example, a plaintiff’s contact with the asbestos may not be regular,
repeated, or over a sufficient period such that his injury was foreseeable. See Satterfield, 266
S.W.3d. at 374 (“[T]he duty we recognize today extends to those who regularly and
repeatedly come into close contact with an employee’s contaminated work clothes over an
extended period of time . . . .”). It is also possible that a plaintiff’s injury is completely
foreseeable, and yet preventing the injury would have been too great a burden on the
defendant. See id. at 368 (considering whether defendant articulated a connection between
its allegedly negligent acts and its ability to provide employment or produce useful products,
as well as whether defendant took reasonable steps to prevent exposure such as requiring
employees to change clothes before leaving the workplace, laundering work clothes on site,
or encouraging employees to shower before leaving work).
155. Upholding stare decisis has value:
It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public if precedents were
not duly regarded, and pretty implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and
stability of such rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who
consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy, and to
trust, and to deal with each other.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 443 (1826).
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with the definition of stare decisis,156 and the second appears to be a
desperate argument of last resort from a defendant who cannot win on the
substance of tort law. Neither premise seems sufficiently strong to warrant
courts softening the significance of foreseeability in name of limited
liability.157
Courts can apply multiple factors,158 but this is not the only structural
safeguard that prevents mere foreseeability from turning into liability. The
structure of the common law negligence claim prevents emphasizing
foreseeability from unnecessarily broadening liability. Plaintiffs must still
prove more than foreseeable harm in a common law negligence claim.159
“For a valid take-home exposure claim, a plaintiff also has to demonstrate
that the harm is attributable to the risks that the defendant itself created.”160
Common law negligence requires that a plaintiff establish: “(1) a duty of
care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant
falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an
injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause.”161
Under these requirements, merely finding that a duty exists and that injury
occurred does not expose a defendant to liability. Plaintiffs must still prove
that the defendant breached the duty of care and that defendant’s breach
caused plaintiff’s injury.

156. “The doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
157. To suggest that either of these premises are “articulated countervailing principle[s]
or polic[ies]” as required by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) seems disingenuous.
158. See generally Chaisson, 947 So. 2d at 182; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In exceptional cases, when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a
particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the
ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 291-93 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (applying several different factors to the evaluation of
an actor’s conduct).
159. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 371 (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”); see
generally Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 391 (2011) (discussing the things a plaintiff must
demonstrate in addition to “the harm [being] a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
actions”).
160. Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 391 (2011).
161. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355.
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Thus, any defendant held to be liable under this test, will have been
found to have a duty only after a balancing of multiple factors.
Furthermore, the defendant must have breached this duty, and the breach
must have caused harm to the plaintiff. In addition, any award of damages
would be subject to any contributory negligence or comparative fault
restrictions imposed by the various states. It seems incredulous to suggest
that a court acts unreasonably by holding a defendant accountable after
clearing each of these hurdles.
While damages in these cases may be financially burdensome, “the
financial burden of compensating these injuries . . . does not vanish into the
ether”162 when the court finds that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty.
Instead, the financial burden shifts from the asbestos user to an innocent
bystander. This shift is inconsistent with the allocation of costs
contemplated by tort law.163 “The overall policy of preventing future harm is
ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct
upon those responsible.”164 If any party can prevent physical injury, it is the
party that was able to look ahead and foresee the potential harm to the
plaintiff.165
Under the foreseeability first test, no defendant can be found in breach of
his duty to another unless the defendant foresaw or should have foreseen
the danger to others, disregarded this danger, and acted irresponsibly. Any
such finding is not an unreasonable broadening of liability, but rather a
showing of equal justice under law.
B. Public Policy Favors Accountability in Asbestos Litigation.
To the extent that public policy governs the scope of one’s duty, public
policy favors holding employers accountable for take-home asbestos
exposures. While it is true that courts are not precluded from relying on
policy to limit one’s duty,166 courts must rely upon and specify some
162. Id. at 371 (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”).
163. See generally Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297 (Cal. 2016) (“[T]he tort
system contemplates that the cost of an injury, instead of amounting to a ‘needless’ and
‘overwhelming misfortune to the prson injured,’ will instead ‘be insured by the [defendant]
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.’”).
164. Id. at 295.
165. See id. at 297 (“[A]llocation of costs [to the defendant] ensure[s] that those ‘best
situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to do so.”).
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[W]hen an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”).
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substantive policy that is furthered by limiting the scope of one’s duty.167
Though the Restatement (Third) of Torts does mention denying or limiting
liability,168 it only supports such a decision if “an articulated countervailing
principle or policy”169 so warrants.170 These policies may include the social
utility of the defendant’s conduct, stated legislative policy, judicial
efficiency, or any number of other desirable public policies.
While considerations of a given policy may affect a decision on the
existence or scope of one’s duty, the court should not create its own public
policy for the sake of limiting liability. Liability limitation, on its own, is not
a valid public policy for the courts to implement without legislative
instruction.171 The court is not responsible for using public policy to enforce
dollar limits on judgments. Instead, if public policy dictates that liability
should be limited for employers, the legislature should play this role.172 It is
clear that legislatures can effectively address this issue if it is their will.173
Lastly, there is regulatory authority to suggest that the public policy actually
favors holding employers liable for mishandling asbestos.174

167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A no-duty ruling represents a determination . . . that no
liability should be imposed on actors in a category of cases. Such a ruling should be
explained and justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify exempting these
actors from liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care.”) (emphasis added).
171. See Norman Singer & Shamble Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTR. §47:23 (7th ed. 2016)
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, like all rules of construction,
may apply . . . to help determine a legislature’s intent that is otherwise not clear.
Expressio unius instructs that, where a statute designates a form of conduct, the
manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which
it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were intentional exclusions.
The rule of construction states that legislative omissions are presumed to be intentional.
Thus, if there is no articulated legislative preference for limiting liability, the court should
refrain from using limited liability as a rationale for finding that no duty exists.
172. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(1) (West) (limiting the scope of
duty in take-home asbestos cases).
173. See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §47:23 (7th ed. 2016).
174. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(a)(1) (2012) (“This section applies to all
occupational exposures to asbestos in all industries . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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1. Federal regulations require managing asbestos exposure.
Regulatory authority clearly indicates that “there is a strong public policy
limiting or forbidding the use of asbestos.”175 In 1971, the United States
Department of Labor established The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”).176 OSHA regulations place employers on notice
of expected safety practices in employment contexts.177 The OSHA
regulations on asbestos usage in the workplace are expansive,178 and clearly
indicate that the federal government considers asbestos to be a highly
dangerous substance.179 “These rigorous measures reflect OSHA’s
awareness that the deadly and communicable nature of asbestos fibers
merits mandating an involved process to prevent the spread of asbestos
fibers . . . .”180 “These requirements were instituted despite the financial and
other costs to businesses of implementing them.”181 Rather than
emphasizing the burden that liability might potentially impose on a
defendant, “[t]he severely dangerous character of asbestos should factor
much more heavily in the analysis of whether defendant had a duty to
mitigate the risk involved.”182
2. Limiting liability is not a policy consideration under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts.
Courts considering whether a defendant owed a duty in a take-home
asbestos case should not seek to limit liability by making a “no-duty” rule as
a matter of public policy. Though some courts have made no-duty
rulings,183 these rulings seem to be inconsistent with other stated public
175. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297-98 (Cal. 2016).
176. OSHA, Timeline of OSHA’s 40 Year History. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/osha40/timeline.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (“The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration was established in 1971.”).
177. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(a)(1) (2012).
178. See generally id. (“This section applies to all occupational exposures to asbestos in all
industries . . . .”).
179. See generally id. (requiring respiratory protection, danger signs, and other
precautionary measures).
180. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 230 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. Dissenting).
181. Id. at 232.
182. Id. at 233.
183. See Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In
some cases, when the consequences of a negligent act must be limited to avoid an intolerable
burden on society, ‘policy considerations may dictate a cause of action should not be
sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.’”) (citations omitted); id. (quoting O’Neill v.
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policies. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, “[a]n actor whose
negligence is a factual cause of physical harm is subject to liability for any
such harm within the scope of liability.”184 Although the Restatement
considers the possibility that the court will find the ordinary duty of care
inapplicable,185 that is the exception, not the rule. The general presumption
is that an actor whose negligence causes physical harm is subject to
liability.186
One can reasonably infer that public policy incentivizes reasonable
behavior that avoids physical harm to others.187 If a court did make a
categorical no-duty rule, that court would be giving “employers carte
blanche to expose workers to communicable toxic substances without
taking any measure whatsoever to prevent those substances from harming
others.”188 Such a ruling would run in stark contrast to the public policy
instruction responsible for awarding damages for negligent conduct. By
requiring defendants to pay damages for their negligent conduct, courts
“ensure that those ‘best situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to
do so.”189 Given asbestos’s harmful effects, it is difficult to imagine any
“countervailing state policy promoting the use of asbestos to outweigh our
general presumption in favor of incentivizing reasonable preventative
measures.”190
Defendants in take-home asbestos cases argue that “the costs of paying
compensation for injuries that a jury finds they have actually caused would

Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1007 (Cal. 2012)) (“[S}trong policy considerations counsel against
imposing a duty of care on pump and valve manufacturers to prevent asbestos-related
disease.”); see also Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa
2009) (concluding that a take-home asbestos case was an appropriate time to modify the
duty to exercise reasonable care under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation, 840 N.E.2d
115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (expressing concern over “the specter of limitless liability”). But cf.
Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 299 (Cal. 2016). (“We disapprove Campbell v. Ford
Motor Co. . . . .”).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
185. Id. (stating that”unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable
care is inapplicable”).
186. Id.
187. See generally id.
188. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 225 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
189. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297 (Cal. 2016).
190. Id.
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be so great that [courts] should find no duty to prevent those injuries.”191
This argument is flawed because “shielding tortfeasors from the full
magnitude of their liability for past wrongs is not a proper consideration in
determining the existence of a duty.”192 The most relevant burden on
defendants in duty analysis is not the defendant’s potential liability, but
rather the “cost to the defendants of upholding, not violating, the duty of
ordinary care.”193 When a court creates a no-duty rule, the court creates a
categorical rule against liability for a particular class of cases.194 Potentially
broad liability “[does] not clearly justify a categorical rule against liability
for foreseeable take-home exposure.”195 Therefore, no-duty rules premised
on prevention of expansive liability in take-home asbestos cases are
inconsistent with the role duty plays in tort law.196
The burden on defendants to prevent take-home asbestos exposure is rather
insubstantial. “The measures to prevent take-home exposure essentially boil
down to ensuring that workers shower and change clothes after encountering
asbestos.”197 These “simple actions” can prevent take-home asbestos exposure
altogether.198 To argue that defendants owe no duty in take-home asbestos
cases because there is a potential for expansive liability “grossly overstat[es] the
burden of imposing a duty. It [considers] not the gravity of the health risks or
even . . . the relatively marginal costs of prevention.”199
3. The legislature is the appropriate mechanism for limiting employer
liability.
Legislatures can, and many have, limited employers’ liability. Around the
country, certain types of business entities enjoy limited liability.200 However,
191. Id. at 296.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate
relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”).
195. Kesner, 384 P.3d at 298.
196. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (requiring some articulated principle for the limitation or
modification of one’s duty).
197. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 233 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (“Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law.”).
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these legislative allowances for limited liability typically protect
shareholders, not the entities themselves.201 The legislative grant of limited
liability202 and the business judgment rule203 are evidence that society values
limited liability in the business setting. Despite this societal value,
legislatures have left business entities decidedly “on the hook” for the harms
they cause.204
Further, the societal value of encouraging individuals to participate in
business is seemingly irrelevant to a business entity’s desire for preventing
expansive liability. Limited liability for persons involved in an entity serves
to protect people, not businesses.205 This is further illustrated by the
business judgment rule, which serves to protect the business decisions made
by individual decision-makers rather than the corporate entity.206 Public
policy clearly protects business people. However, limitation of liability in
take-home asbestos cases does not protect individual people. Limiting
liability in take-home asbestos exposure cases, as a matter of public policy,
protects the business entity itself. While liability for take-home asbestos
cases may indirectly impact the business people, the individuals themselves
are not held accountable by reason of being in the business.
Furthermore, the fact that legislatures have accounted for limited liability
in other ways suggests that public policy does not favor limited liability in
take-home asbestos cases. The legislature has the power to limit liability for
asbestos exposure via statute.207 For instance, a legislature could draft a
statute that limits liability by creating a particularized class of persons to
whom a duty is owed208 or by putting a statutory cap on damages in a
particular class of cases.

201. Id. at 89-90.
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (2015).
203. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), decision modified on
reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (“The business judgment rule . . . operates to preclude
a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”).
204. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (2015).
205. See id.
206. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (stating that the business judgment rule protects the
decisions of corporate directors).
207. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(I) (West 2004).
208. See id.
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C. The Case Against Emphasizing Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinctions.
“[T]here runs through much of the law a distinction between action and
inaction.”209 While it is true that there is generally no duty to rescue,210
courts have a tendency to incorrectly conclude that all omissions constitute
nonfeasance.211 Illustrative of this point, the Satterfield court described a
hypothetical in which “a driver who fails to apply his or her brakes to avoid
hitting a pedestrian walking in a crosswalk” is negligent because his or her
“careless failure to apply the brakes . . . is negligent driving, not negligent
failure to rescue.”212 This is true, even though failing to apply the brakes “is
an omission.”213 Still, “[t]he fact . . . the actor realizes or should realize that
action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”214 This tendency to
assume omissions are nonfeasance (as well as the relationship misfeasance
and nonfeasance share with causation) makes application of the
misfeasance-nonfeasance factor undesirable.
Despite these problems, some courts heavily emphasized this
misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction in take-home asbestos cases. In Price,
the court focused on whether there was misfeasance or nonfeasance.215
Having only considered this factor, the court placed an ultimatum on the
plaintiff: prove misfeasance, or face the new burden of proving a special
relationship.216 This approach is inconsistent with the presumption that a
duty exists if an actor’s conduct has created a risk of harm.217 There are a
209. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (citing
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984)).
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or
emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other unless a court determines that
one of the affirmative duties provided . . . is applicable.”).
211. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011)
(holding that there was nonfeasance).
212. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 357 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(alteration in original)).
215. Price, 26 A.3d at 168 (“The legal issue here is whether [defendant] committed
misfeasance affecting [plaintiff].”).
216. Id. at 169 (“Having alleged only nonfeasance, to recover against DuPont, Price must
allege that a ‘special relationship’ existed . . . .”).
217. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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number of other factors or policy considerations that a court can make to
help limit this liability, but placing this ultimatum on the plaintiff without
even considering foreseeability is wholly inconsistent with the approach
advocated by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.218
Another relevant case on the matter is CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams.219
Though the CSX Transp. court first considered an employer’s duty to
provide a safe workplace for employees,220 the court also considered the
distinction between action and inaction.221 The court incorrectly applied
this factor. In its analysis, the court wrote “these cases do not involve CSXT
itself spreading asbestos dust among the general population, thereby
creating a dangerous situation in the world beyond the workplace.”222 While
it may be true that the defendants themselves have not deliberately placed
asbestos in people’s homes, there is no such requirement.223 In CSX Transp.,
the defendants operated their business with asbestos products, and they
exposed their employees to the asbestos fibers each day. This conduct
created a dangerous situation.224
The omission to prevent harm may still be misfeasance.225 The actor’s
entire course of conduct is what creates misfeasance or nonfeasance.226 In
instances where the defendant’s conduct creates a risk of harm, the

218. See generally id. (The concern over whether the actor’s conduct creates a risk of
harm suggests that foreseeability should be considered.).
219. Supra section I.B.1.
220. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 ( Ga. 2005).
221. Id. at 210.
222. Id.
223. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tenn. 2008).
[D]istinguishing between misfeasance and nonfeasance can best be
accomplished, not by focusing on whether an individual’s “specific failure to
exercise reasonable care is an error of commission or omission,” but rather by
focusing on whether the individual’s entire course of conduct created a risk of
harm. Thus, even though the specific negligent act may constitute an omission,
the entirety of the conduct may still be misfeasance that created a risk of harm.
Id.
224. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 171 (Del. 2011)
(Berger, J., dissenting) (“[Defendant’s] affirmative act was the release of asbestos in the
workplace.”).
225. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357 (using a hypothetical describing a negligent driver to
illustrate that omissions may constitute misfeasance if “the individual’s entire course of
conduct created a risk of harm”).
226. Id.
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defendant ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care.227 Once the
conduct has created a risk of harm, liability hinges upon factual and
proximate cause.228 Distinguishing between action and inaction seems to
implicate causation more so than duty. To ask whether the plaintiff was
injured by the defendant’s actions or the defendant’s inaction inherently
asks: “What caused the plaintiff’s harm?” For this reason, and because
courts tend to misinterpret the distinction between omissions and
nonfeasance, this Note suggests that misfeasance and nonfeasance need not
be considered in take-home asbestos exposure cases.
In the context of the hypothetical discussed in the opening paragraph of
Section I,229 the defendant’s course of conduct is invariably what caused the
original asbestos exposure. The only way that hypothetical could resolve
itself without defendant’s course of conduct creating a risk is if some other
person was responsible for the initial asbestos exposure. Even if that were
the case, then misfeasance and nonfeasance are still not necessary to resolve
the case. In scenarios where the person causing the initial asbestos exposure
is not a defendant, the case should be dismissed upon failing to prove the
cause in fact requirement.
D. Legislation allows for courts to decide the existence and scope of duty
more efficiently.
Take-home asbestos cases provide a unique fact pattern that leaves state
courts in a conundrum. 230 On the one hand, courts are often fearful231 of

227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) (subjecting defendants to liability for harms within the scope of liability).
229. See supra Section I (hypothetical describing scenario in which A is exposed to
asbestos at work for Company B, and in turn exposes a family member, person C, to asbestos
at home).
230. See Flinn, supra note 119, at 751-756. See generally Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010).
231. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation, 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (noting “the
specter of limitless liability”); see also Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d
689, 696 (2009) (concluding that a take-home asbestos case was an appropriate time to
modify the duty to exercise reasonable care under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); Campbell v. Ford Motor Co.,
141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402 (2012) (“In some cases, when the consequences of a negligent act
must be limited to avoid an intolerable burden on society, ‘policy considerations may dictate
a cause of action should not be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.’”) (citations
omitted); see also id. at 403 (quoting O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1007 (2012)).
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creating sweeping liability.232 On the other, plaintiffs are often facing fatal
disease.233 To explain its decisions, state courts dive into deep analysis about
the policies that govern their own duty precedent.234 The courts
adjudicating these matters are often left to make policy decisions by
balancing factors.235 These policy decisions put the court at risk of
overstepping the boundaries of judicial power.236
Although this Note advocates for a judicial test tailored to resolve takehome asbestos exposure cases, that test is more a necessity than the ideal
outcome. Ideally, each state legislature would create a statute that specifies
the class of persons to whom employers owe a duty. Regardless of whether
this class of persons were limited to employees, employees’ family members,
all foreseeable plaintiffs, or some other variation, statutes can help end the
uncertainty around take-home asbestos litigation. While courts may apply
policy, considerations of policy are better handled by a legislature. If given
statutory authority on the matter, courts no longer run the risk of

(“[S]trong policy considerations counsel against imposing a duty of care on pump and valve
manufacturers to prevent asbestos-related disease.”).
232. Although for reasons discussed in Section II.A.2, supra, this concern is not
dispositive.
233. See ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2016); see Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351 (twenty-five-year-old woman who contracted
mesothelioma); Boley, 929 N.E. 2d at 450 (plaintiff diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma).
234. See Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 181 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2006)
(noting seven different factors for Louisiana duty analysis); Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re
Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Mich.
2007) (comparing Louisiana’s heavy reliance on foreseeability to Michigan’s heavy reliance
on the relationship between the parties); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d
347, 355 (Tenn. 2008) (“[T]his case implicates core principles of Tennessee’s tort law . . . .”).
235. See Chaisson, 947 So. 2d at 181(noting seven different factors for Louisiana duty
analysis); Miller, 740 N.W.2d at 215 (comparing Louisiana’s heavy reliance on foreseeability
to Michigan’s heavy reliance on the relationship between the parties); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d
at 354, 367 (noting that the case implicates the core of its tort law as well as listing eight
factors it will consider).
236. See generally Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367-68 (“When considering these factors,
courts should take care not to invade the province of the jury. A court’s function is more
limited than a jury’s.”); see also id. at 367 (listing factors that are representative of the will of
the people, and therefore more appropriately considered in the legislature: “the importance
or social value of the activity engaged in by the defendant . . . the usefulness of conduct to the
defendant . . . .”) (emphasis added); Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20 (Del. 2009)
(“The Restatement (Third) of Torts creates duties in areas where we have previously found
no common law duty and have deferred to the legislature to decide whether or not to create a
duty.”) (emphasis added).

230

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:199

overstepping its boundaries. Instead, simple application of the statute would
resolve the case.
As discussed earlier,237 courts tend to worry about creating limitless
liability. Such a concern is understandable, but not controlling.238 Not only
can state legislatures declare the state’s policy on the extent of an employer’s
duty in take-home asbestos cases,239 but state legislatures may also declare to
what extent (if any) liability is to be limited.
Legislative authority on the matter has already been effective in guiding
at least one state court.240 Recognizing the “virtual explosion in asbestos
litigation,”241 the Ohio legislature passed legislation governing “all tort
actions for asbestos claims brought against a premises owner to recover
damages or other relief for exposure to asbestos on the premises owner’s
property.”242 The statute provides that “[a] premises owner is not liable for
any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that
individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the
premises owner’s property.”243 This type of legislation allows the state to
more accurately reflect public policies valued by society in these decisions
than any judicial balancing test.
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.244 is a good example of the
simplicity a statute would bring to take-home asbestos cases. In Boley, the
plaintiff was exposed to asbestos dust at home while laundering her
husband’s work clothes.245 The plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant
mesothelioma,246 and filed suit against more than 200 defendants, including
Goodyear.247 Rather than addressing a wide array of public policies in an in
depth duty analysis, the court framed the issue as “whether R.C.
2307.941(A) bars all tort liability against a premises owner for asbestos
exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property if the exposure
occurred away from the owner’s property or whether R.C. 2307941(A) is

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
(2011).
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See supra Section II.A.2.
Id.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A) (West 2004).
See Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010).
Michael D. Kelly, Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 901
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A) (West 2004).
Id. at § 2307.941(A)(1).
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 449-50.
Id. at 450.
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inapplicable in such instances, thus permitting recovery against a premises
owner.”248 By framing the issue in this way, the court avoided any sweeping
statements of law that would unnecessarily impact other negligence cases.
Rather, the court turned to principals of statutory construction to resolve a
dispute as to the meaning of the statute.249 The court concluded that “a
premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos
exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the
exposure occurred at the owner’s property.”250
If each jurisdiction had statutory authority to rely upon for this issue, all
jurisdictions could engage in this type of analysis to resolve these claims
without resorting to an arbitrary weighing of factors. One benefit provided
by these types of statutes is that the court can adjudicate without creating
new law. In addition, the parties are much more likely to know ahead of
time whether they have a claim, reducing the number of take-home
exposure lawsuits. Reliance upon well-drafted statutes simultaneously
achieves just results and increases judicial efficiency.
III. CONCLUSION
As state courts across the country decide take-home asbestos exposure
cases, the existence and scope of the defendant’s duty is best determined by
first examining foreseeability. If treated as a threshold matter, foreseeability
can serve as a useful vehicle for limiting what has become a massive number
of cases, many of which are frivolous. If balanced by consideration of other
mitigating factors, treating foreseeability as a threshold matter does not
result in limitless liability, but instead applies common law negligence in a
straight-forward manner. Under this paradigm, there can be no duty
without foreseeability. However, foreseeability alone is insufficient for the
court to find that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Instead, the court
must balance other factors such as the existence of a legal relationship, the
burden of preventing the harm, the possible magnitude of the potential
harm or injury, the feasibility of alternative conduct, and the relative safety
of that alternative conduct. These factors are useful for determining the
scope, if any, of a defendant’s purported duty.
If other factors, such as the distinction between affirmative acts and
omissions are considered in advance of foreseeability, it is easy for the law
248. Id. at 449.
249. See Boley, 929 N.E 2d at 451 (noting the emphasis on legislative intent, looking to
the language of the statue, and the purpose of the statute, as well as the policy for application
of a clear and unambiguous statute).
250. Id. at 453.
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to be misapplied. Still, while judicial balancing tests allow for courts to
consider the totality of the circumstances in duty analysis, these tests can be
inefficient. Legislation that defines which classes of individuals, if any, are
owed a duty of reasonable care by employers in take-home asbestos
exposure allows courts to simply apply canons of statutory construction to
resolve otherwise difficult cases.

